EXILE ² Shanghai

今天偶然溜达一下, 发现了Jason写的这篇文章. 我觉得国内真的要呼吁人人都练中国”功夫”了.

功夫网非官方网站已经无法正常访问; 最近论坛门事件也闹得风风火火… 唉~! 我终于能理解中国人移民的心情, 他们不断努力的去申请申请再申请, 出国出国再出国. 大国申请不到去小国, 跑到冰岛都无所谓, 一个中国人竟然为了躲避”本地特产”都躲出国了… 嗯~! 我终于也理解为什么老外谈”功夫”色变, 一个中国人再他们面前”啊咤~!啊咤~!”两下就吓得两腿打哆嗦, 原因不是因为李小龙, 也是不是什么降龙十八掌, 而是”功夫”.他们知道如果”功夫”遍地开花, 以后闲下来时就不能找借口上街游行露营什么的, 也不能再网络上说自己想说的. 加上游行、网络这东西免费, 搞不好有个BBC或CCB的来访问还能搏个出位. 如果不让他们这么干, 闲都闲死.

当然, 再国内你也可以游行露营上网什么的. 但是游行的主题必须打爱国口号. 露营就到野外吧. 上网?… 能访问的全是ORG结尾的官网, 如果你敢游行的同时吧领导人的头像上打一些Shit或Fuck的词语, 你死定了… 等着叫你母亲帮你打官司吧, 而且保证你赢不了, 因为他们都一伙的…

最近看了一条说什么斯坦的网民网费高的吓人, 1MDSL的包月费用就上千美刀, 连拨号都能拨个几百美刀一个月. 我再想如果中国电信这伙土匪推一个什么无”功夫”网络包月, 就算打个上千美刀一个月, 我相信生意不要太好.

最近也很郁闷, 上个网都要戴套. 又不是ML, 戴来干嘛?… 因为”功夫”. Flickr、BlogSpot等等我经常喜欢上的网站都”功夫”了, 中了最厉害的一招”乾坤大挪移”, 不知道的还以为网站改版, 都白底黑字的打上”您无法载入任何页面”之类的白痴提示. 以前的人ML是没有套套这个东西的, 后来人们好像为了躲一个什么AIDS的东西发明了套套… 现在, 连上网都要套套, 我倒没有发现上网也会得AIDS之类的症状, 就连感冒都没中过招. 越想越不明白, 为什么要戴套, 要怎么”安全”干嘛?… “功夫”…啊咤~!啊咤~!

我现在对着电脑又点害怕, 因为我没练过”功夫”, 严重怀疑跟它坐一起我会不会得什么梅毒花柳的… MM们小心哦, 可能会怀孕也说不准.

最后说想跟”伟大的墙墙”说一句经典的台词, 出自李小龙先生的… …”我读的书少~!你不要欺负我~!”

Wiki上关于墙墙的说明:

Enforcement

been often lifted for special occasions. One example was the New York Times which was unblocked when reporters in a private interview with Jiang Zemin specifically asked about the block and he replied that he would look into the matter. During the APEC summit in Shanghai during 2001, normally-blocked media sources such as CNN, NBC, and the Washington Post suddenly became accessible. Since 2001, the content controls have been further relaxed on a permanent basis, and all three of the sites previously mentioned are now accessible from mainland China. In fact, most foreign news organizations’ web sites are accessible, though a small number (including BBC News) continue to be blocked.

Mainland China agencies frequently issue regulations about the Internet, but these are often not enforced or are ignored. One major problem in enforcement is determining who has jurisdiction over the Internet, causing many bureaucratic turf battles within the PRC government among various ministries and between central and local officials. The State Council Information Office has the mandate to regulate the Internet, but other security agencies in mainland China have a say as well.

Some legal scholars have pointed out that the frequency at which the PRC government issues new regulations on the Internet is a symptom of their ineffectiveness because the new regulations never make reference to the previous set of regulations, which appear to have been forgotten.

Golden Shield Project

The banning appears to be mostly uncoordinated and ad-hoc, with some sites being blocked and similar sites being allowed or even blocked in one city and allowed in another.[5] The blocks have The Golden Shield Project (Chinese: 金盾工程; Pinyin: jīndùn gōngchéng) is owned by Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (MPS). It started in 1998, began the process in November of 2003, and the first part of the project passed the national inspection on November 16, 2006 in Beijing. According to MPS, it is to construct a communication network and computer information system for police to improve their capability and efficiency. According to China Central Television (CCTV), up to 2002, the preliminary work of the Golden Shield Project cost US$800 million (equivalent to RMB 6,400 million or €640 million).

It may be known outside mainland China as the Great Firewall of China (in reference both to its role as a network firewall and to the ancient Great Wall of China). The system blocks content by preventing IP addresses from being routed through and consists of standard firewall and proxy servers at the Internet gateways. The system also selectively engages in DNS poisoning when particular sites are requested. The government does not appear to be systematically examining Internet content, as this appears to be technically impractical.

Technical information

Some commonly used methods for censoring content are:

IP blocking. Access to a certain IP address is denied. If the target website is hosted in a shared hosting server, all websites on the same server will be blocked. This affects all IP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP. A typical circumvention method is to find proxies that have access to the target websites, but proxies may be jammed or blocked, and some websites, such as Wikipedia (when editing), also block proxies. Some large websites like Google have allocated additional IP addresses to circumvent the block, but later the block was extended to cover the new IPs.

DNS filtering and redirection. Don’t resolve domain names, or return incorrect IP addresses. This affects all IP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP. A typical circumvention method is to find a domain name server that resolves domain names correctly, but domain name servers are subject to blockage as well, especially IP blocking. Another workaround is to bypass DNS if the IP address is obtainable from other sources and is not blocked. Examples are modifying the Hosts file or typing the IP address instead of the domain name in a Web browser.

URL filtering. Scan the requested Uniform Resource Locator (URL) string for target keywords regardless of the domain name specified in the URL. This affects the HTTP protocol. Typical circumvention methods are to use escaped characters in the URL, or to use encrypted protocols such as VPN and TLS/SSL.

Packet filtering. Terminate TCP packet transmissions when a certain number of controversial keywords are detected. This affects all TCP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP, but Search engine results pages are more likely to be censored. Typical circumvention methods are to use encrypted connections - such as VPN and TLS/SSL - to escape the HTML content, or by reducing the TCP/IP stack’s MTU/MMS to reduce the amount of text contained in a given packet.

Connection reset. If a previous TCP connection is blocked by the filter, future connection attempts from both sides will also be blocked for up to 30 minutes. Depending on the location of the block, other users or websites may also be blocked if the communication is routed to the location of the block. A circumvention method is to ignore the reset packet sent by the firewall.

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